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IN RE HARRY BRIDGES
THE BACKGROUND
AN understanding of the Bridges deportation case involves viewing the
legal issues in their economic, political, and social setting. Particularly signi-
ficant parts of that scene are Bridges' success as a union leader in a tense
labor struggle on the West Coast, the history of United States alien laws and
policy, the problems of wartime labor morale, and the anti-alien hysteria
engendered by armed conflict. But only the background as a whole sets off
the problems adequately.
The deportation of Harry Bridges was first sought in 1934. In that year,
immediately after his selection as the chairman of the Joint Strike Com-
mittee in the maritime strike on the Pacific Coast, organized political and
employer groups and the press began the agitation.' A resulting thorough
1. The opposition was led by Harper Knowles, Chairman of the Radical Research
Committee of the California American Legion, which committee "had close working
arrangements with the Army, the Navy, the State Bureau of Criminal Identification,
police departments, sheriffs' offices, the State Peace Officers Association, immigration
inspectors, private detective agencies, manufacturers, labor and industrial associations,
farmers protective associations, chambers of commerce, and civic, fraternal, and other
veterans' groups." Landis, In the Matter of Harry R. Bridges, Findinigs and Conclu-
sions of the Trial Examiner (1939) 50.
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investigation by the Immigration Service produced no evidence which, in
the opinion of the Service, would warrant his expulsion.2 Nevertheless,
private groups, in cooperation with the head of the Portland Police Depart-
ment, pursued the inquiry along a different line, in a systematic attempt
to get witnesses and affidavits by dubious methods.3 Two years of diligent
effort produced the desired result. On March 2, 1938, the arrest of Bridges
was ordered by a warrant, which granted a hearing to show cause why he
should not be deported in conformity with the law.
The law at that time made liable to deportation those aliens who: (1)
believe in or advocate overthrow of the government by force or violence;
or (2) "are members of or affiliated with any organization" with such an
aim; or (3) "are members of or affiliated with any organization" that writes,
publishes, or circulates, or causes to be written, published, or circulated,
literature which advocates governmental overthrow by force or violence.4
'While the Bridges case was awaiting hearing, the United States Supreme
Court, in Kessler v. Streckeru held that these provisions were directed only
against those aliens who were members of a proscribed organization at the
time of arrest. Thereupon the warrant was amended so as to charge that
he both "was and is" a member of or affiliated with the type of organization
condemned. 6 Bridges, nevertheless, was exonerated after a hearing before a
special trial examiner, James M. Landis, whose findings contained sharp
attacks on the credibility of the government witnesses.
2. "The San Francisco police department has followed him unremittingly for years
and our men have also."
"Yes, he has been followed up, not only in this country, but in Australia and other coun-
tries where he lived before he came here."
"The facts, however, are that there is no shred of evidence in our files, or in the files
of the San Francisco police department to indicate that he is in any way subject to the
provisions of the immigration law because of his radical views." Commissioner David
MacCormack in Hearings before Sub-Committee of the Committee on Approtriations
on Departient of Labor Appropriation Bill, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 99-100.
3. In exchange for evidence against Bridges, there were offers of jobs and money,
threats to expose criminal conduct, and promises to secure pardons for the jailed. Lan-
dis, supra note 1, at 52-76.
4. 40 STAT. 1012 (1918), as amended by 41 STAT. 1003 (1920), 8 U. S. C. § 137
(1940).
5. 307 U. S. 22 (1939). The Circuit Court's opinion held directly that membership
in the Communist Party did not render an alien deportable. Strecker v. Kessler, 95 F.
(2d) 976 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938). Therefore, Secretary of Labor Perkins ordered a stay
in the Bridges hearings while the Kessler case went up on appeal. This provoked a
storm of protest which resulted in a call for her impeachment along with two other
Labor Department officials. H. R. 67, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced Jan. 24, 1939).
However, the Judiciary Committee, after an investigation, concluded unanimnsusly that
the facts did not warrant impeachment proceedings. L R. RrP. No. 311, 76-th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1939).
6. Landis, supra note 1, at 1.
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Despite this decision the House of Representatives passed a special bill
directing the Attorney General to deport Bridges, "whose presence in this
country the Congress deems hurtful."7 When referred to the Senate Com-
mittee on Immigration, the bill was denounced by Attorney General Jackson
as "without, indeed, the slightest pretense toward giving the accused what
our nation has long known as 'due process of law.' ,s The bill was un-
favorably reported0 and killed. Finally Congress made a direct attempt to
nullify the Kessler decision by means of Section 23 of the Alien Registration
Act of 1940. It provides:
"Any alien who was at the time of entering the United States,
or has been at any time thereafter, a member of any one of the
classes of aliens enumerated in section 1 of this Act, shall .
be . . . deported in the manner provided in the Immigration Act
of February 5, 1917."10
On August 24, 1940, the Federal Bureau of Investigation was ordered by
the Attorney General to determine whether grounds existed for reopening
deportation proceedings against Bridges."' In November, the FBI submitted
a lengthy report to the Attorney General, 2 and in February, 1941, a second
warrant calling for Bridges' deportation was issued. After hearings, held
in March and April, Inspector Charles Sears made proposed findings that
Bridges was a member of or affiliated with both the Communist Party and
the Marine Workers Industrial Union, and that these organizations were
within the ban of the statute.13 These proposed findings were unanimously
reversed by the Board of Immigration Appeals. 14 In turn, the Board was
7. H. R. 9766, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (introduced May 14, 1940).
8. SErN. REP. No. 2031, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) 8-10. For argument that the
bill was a direct violation of the constitutional prohibition against bills of attainder, see
Comment (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 1358, 1361-1364.
9. SEN. REP. No. 2031, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).
10. 54 STAT. 673, 8 U. S. C. § 137 (1940). Representative Hobbs, who had
voted against the special bill, because it "frankly transgresses one of the cardinal prin-
ciples which our founding forefathers would have died to preserve inviolate" [86 CoN,(.
REc. 8201 (1940)], said, "It is my joy to announce that this bill will do, in a perfectly
legal and constitutional manner, what the bill specifically aimed at the deportation of
Harry Bridges seeks to accomplish. This bill changes the law so that the Department
of Justice should now have little trouble in deporting Harry Bridges . . ." 86 CONG.
REc. 9031 (1940).
11. See N. Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1940, p. 16, col. 3.
12. Before the Attorney General took any action on the report, FBI Director
Hoover announced, "Our report confirms that Bridges is a Communist and that the
Communist Party advocates overthrow of the United States Government." N. Y. Times,
Dec. 17, 1940, p. 1, col. 2.
13. Sears, In the Matter of Harry Renton Bridges, Memorandum of Decision (1941).
14. it re: Harry Renton Bridges, Before the Board of Immigration Appeals in
Deportation Proceedings (1942) (one member not participating).
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reversed by Attorney General Biddle,", who later denied a petition for rehear-
ing filed by Bridges' attorneys.' Before this denial the case had been placed
in the hands of the District Court for the Northern District of California,
Southern Division, through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed June
2 of this year.
THE STATUTE
The constitutionality of the statute invoked in the Bridges case turns on
a resolution of the conflict between the broad power of the legislature and
the rights of the alien. Although the courts hold that, in deporting aliens,
the government is exercising the sovereign power of revoking a privilege,1
they have also emphasized that there are constitutional limitations to that
power.'
s
The Statute and Civil Liberties. The legislative .authority has determined
that past or present membership in or affiliation with an outlawed organ-
ization is sufficient ground for revoking an alien's privilege of Semaining in
this country. A decision that such a provision unreasonably limits civil
liberties obviously involves a determination that aliens are entitled to the
substantive guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
Although the Supreme Court has not expressly extended civil liberties to
the alien, the reasons for protection of an individual's right to free speech
and assembly hold true for the alien as well as the citizen. The judicial
rationale has been that the exercise of free speech is more a benefit to the
whole of society than a privilege extended to the individual. Holmes ex-
pressed it thus:
" . . . that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market
. .. . That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.""'
15. Biddle, In re Harry Bridges, Before the Attorney General in Deportation Pro-
ceedings (1942). Pursuant to the provisions of the Reorganization Act of 1939 [53 ST,xr.
561 (1939), 5 U. S. C. §§ 133-133r (1940)] the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice was transferred in 1940 from the Department of Labor to the Department of Jus-
tice [54 ST.T. 1238 (1940)].
16. N. Y. Times, June 5, 1942, p. 27, col. 5.
17. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 693, 711 (1S93).
18. See The Japanese Immigrant Case, 1S9 U. S. 86, 100-101 (1903); Wong Wing
v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 238, 242 (1S96); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356,
370 (1886). On the other hand, exclusion of aliens is not so much limited, since prior
presence in the country is the cause for the protection. See United States ex rel. Turner
v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279, 292 (1904) ; ALFT.X.tnTDzR, RIGHTS OF ALIENS Uxr'za THE Fun-
EAL CoN TITuTiON (1931) 75, 95-96.
19. Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, ?30
(1919).
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Despite a variety of explanations and criticisms of this attitude, 20 the
Supreme Court has accepted it to the extent of doing away with the pre-
sumption of constitutionality in cases involving civil liberties.21 The instant
statute, therefore, should be closely scrutinized by the judiciary.
The First Amendment denies to Congress the right to pass any law
"abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of griev-
ances." 22 It has already been determined that these provisions do not apply
to an exclusion case, since Congress has the power to determine the con-
ditions upon which an alien is to be admitted. 23 But the same reasoning
does not extend to the case of a resident alien, lawfully admitted. The
Amendment states that "Congress shall pass no law abridging the freedom
of speech . . . and the right of the people peaceably to assemble . . ."
Nothing in the language of the Amendment deprives resident aliens of its
protection. Moreover, it is possible to use here a rule applied by the Supreme
Court in determining that the Fourteenth Amendment covers lawfully ad-
mitted alieng.24 That doctrine is that unless the language specifically or
through logical necessity limits the protection to a particular group, it will
be construed as including within its protection everyone, regardless of citizen-
ship.25 Furthermore, in Turner v. Williams,20 in holding that the issue of
the application of the First Amendment had no bearing in the case of excluded
aliens, the Supreme Court said, "He [the excluded alien] does not become
20. See Lusky, Minority Rights and the Public Interest (1942) 52 YALE L. J. 1
passim; Hamilton and Braden, The Special Competence of the Sispreme Court (1941) 50
YALE L. J. 1319, 1350-1357, and articles cited in n. 131 therein; (1940) 40 COL. L. Ri~v.
531, 534.
21. See Mr. Justice Murphy in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 95-96 (1940):
"Mere legislative preference for one rather than another means for combatting substan-
tive evils, therefore, may well prove an inadequate foundation on which to rest regula-
tions which are aimed at or in their operation diminish the effective exercise of rights
so necessary to the maintenance of democratic institutions"; and Mr. Justice Roberts,
in Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 161 (1939): "Mere legislative preferences or
beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at
other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of
rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions. And so, as cases arise, the
delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts to weigh the circumstances and to appraise
the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoy-
ment of the rights."
22. U. S. CONST. AMEND. I.
23. See Li Sing v. United States, 180 U. S. 486, 495 (1901).
24. It was held that the word "persons" meant that the "provisions are universal
in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to
any difference of race, of color, or of nationality." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356,
369 (1886).
25. Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915); see ALEXANDER, RIGHTS OF ALIENS UNDEM
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1931) 95; (1922) 31 YALE L. J. 422.
26. 194 U. S. 279 (1904).
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one of the people to whom these things [rights under the First Amendment]
are secured by our Constitution .... Those who are excluded cannot
assert the rights in general obtaining in a land to which they do not belong as
citizens or othenvise."2 7 Observe here that the Court did not limit these
rights to citizens. Phrases like "one of the people" and "citizens or other-
wise" indicate a broad inclusion; and the latter phrase is an especially strong
indication that aliens are entitled to the protection of the Amendment, since
the "otherwise" could refer only to them.
It is possible, also, that the courts will hold that the "life, liberty, or
property" provisions of the Fifth Amendment are broad enough to include
civil liberties, since aliens already possess the procedural protections of that
Amendment.28 There is a conflict of authority in an analogous situation. In
applying the "life, liberty, or property" provision of the fourteenth Amend-
ment, a lower Pennsylvania court denied an alien the right to free speech there-
under ;2 but a Missouri court held that such a provision in the Missouri
Constitution extended to civil liberties.30 The latter view finds strong support
in Bigelow's edition of Story's Constiulion.
31 It is there said, "'life,'
'liberty' and 'property' . . . are representative terms. . . . It would be
absurd, for instance, to say that arbitrary arrests were forbidden, but that
freedom of speech . . . found no protection here." With this view it is
difficult to disagree. But whether or not the avenue of the Fifth Amend-
ment is to be open to the alien will depend largely on a court's tastes. Since
aliens already possess the safeguard of procedural due process granted by
the Amendment, it is quite probable that the judiciary will prefer to include
aliens' civil liberties under that Amendment. On the other hand, there is
virtue in opening up the First Amendment to aliens and thereby putting
them on a par with our citizenry. Either alternative produces the same
desirable legal result.
But the mere determination that Bridges is entitled to civil liberties is, of
itself, of little importance; for the question remains whether the statute under
which he was ordered deported violates those civil rights. An answer to
this question favorable to Bridges would run counter to a number of lower
federal court opinions.32 Although these cases involve interpretations of
27. Id. at 292.
28. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228 (1896).
29. Goldman v. Reyburn, 36 Pa. Co. Ct. 581 (1909).
30. See Marx & Haas Jeans Clothing Co. v. Watson, 163 Mo. 133, 146, 67 S. I.
391, 394 (1902).
31. 2 STORY, COIMExTARIES ON T CONSTrrunoN OF TE UITED STrs (5th
ed. 1891) § 1950.
32. Kjar v. Doak, 61 F. (2d) 566 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932); Murdock v. Clark, 53 F.
(2d) 155 (C. C. A. 1st, 1931); Vilarino v. Garrity, 50 F. (2d) 5S2 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931);
Antolish v. Paul, 283 Fed. 957 (C. C. A. 7th, 1922); Skeffington v. Katzeff, 277 Fed.
129 (C. C. A. 1st, 1922); In re Saderquist, 11 F. Supp. 525 (D. Me. 1935), aff'd per
cmri m tb nom. Sorquist v. Ward, 83 F. (2d) S90 (C. C. A. 1st, 1936).
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the statute before the retrospective amendment was added, their assumptions
and reasoning apply to the present case. The premise of these cases is that,
in the exercise of sovereignty, the Federal Government may determine the
conditions upon which an alien is granted the privilege of residing in the
country. Further, one of the conditions in the statute is that he must not
become a member or an affiliate of an organization advocating or believing
in the overthrow of the government by force or violence. When the Immi-
gration Department has found such membership or affiliation on enough
evidence, those courts refuse to disturb such findings. And some would so
hold even though the alien had no knowledge of the character of the organ-
ization.33
If aliens are entitled to civil liberties through the Bill of Rights, these
premises deserve reexamination. In the, first place, the statute overrules a
fundamental characteristic of American law-the idea of punishment only
for personal guilt.34 Its language is such that the mere connection with the
proscribed organization is sufficient to 4ustify deportation, regardless of the
alien's knowledge of the aims of the organization. DeJonge v. Oregon "
seems decisive of the issue here, although that case involved the criminal
provisions of a state law. The Supreme Court there held that the fact that
De Jonge, a member of the Communist Party, spoke at a meeting held tinder
the auspices of that party was not sufficient to override his constitutional
rights of free speech. His utterances at the meetin g were said to be the
correct tests of his conduct. 'And, if actual knowledge of aims by the alien
is required, there is all the more reason for demanding actual knowledge of
the literature distributed by the organization-a test which the statute ignores.
The statute's theory of guilt by association thus opens it to attack as being
invalid on its face.
As applied specifically to Bridges, the statute is also vulnerable on the
basis of the De Jonge case. There was no introduction of evidence to show
that Bridges had knowledge of the existence or character of the literature
distributed by the Communist Party. Moreover, the difficulty of a member's
achieving actual knowledge of the aims of an organization is illustrated by
testimony of two of the government witnesses that they were members of
the Communist Party for several years before unearthing its allegedly basic
purpose- the use of force and violence.86 Under those circumstances the
33. See Kjar v. Doak, 61 F. (2d) 566, 569 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932) ; In re Saderquist,
11 F. Supp. 525, 527 (D. Me. 1935), aff'd per curiant sub nor. Sorquist v. Ward, 83
F. (2d) 890 (C. C. A. 1st, 1936).
34. CHA'sF, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941) 470. The author also
quotes from Alfred Bettman and John Lord O'Brian, who enforced the Espionage Act
during the World War, to the effect that guilt by association is an "absolutely complete
departure from our traditional democratic doctrines" and that its adoption is "an
anomaly in our jurisprudence." Id. at 470-471.
35. 299 U. S. 353 (1937). See also Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242, 253 (1937).
36. Record, vol. 6, pp. 823-828, and vol. 10, pp. 1540-1544, In the Matter of Harry
Renton Bridges (1939).
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Immigration Service was forced to proceed on a theory of guilt by associa-
tion. In the second hearing, for example, government counsel did not question
Bridges directly as to his personal aims and purposes. Furthermore, the
Bridges affiliation with the Communist Party, as found by Inspector Sears,
was the result of acceptance of Communist aid in organizing workers and
directing a strike.3 7 The strike activity, however, is legitimate under the
doctrine of the Dc longe case. *Moreover, Bridges' attorneys have made, and
the government has not refuted, the assertion that prior to the strike the
late Conmissioner MacCormack of the Department of Labor had ordered
the service not to deport aliens for membership in the union in question.38
Apparently, then, an alien is being deported for past affiliation with a group,
when the Immigration Service had previously said there were no penalties
for niemberslip in it. In any case, if the application of the statute is limited,
as the De Jonge decision indicates it should be, to those cases where actual
knowledge of purposes and distributed literature is proved, then there is
no evidence of Bridges' affiliation in aims which are in violation of the statute.
The "clear and present danger" test-3 provides a more important argument
against the reasoning of those lower federal courts which have followed the
statute and enforced the decisions of the Immigration Department. Nearly
every recent free-speech decision of the Supreme Court has cited this test
with approval. 40 If the civil liberties of aliens are recognized as on a par
with those of citizens, the statute seems invalid on this ground. Bridges
himself is not charged with personally improper conduct or the expression
of views in violation of the statute. Rather he is to be deported for tenuous
relations with groups which assertedly advocate governmental overthrow;
but nowhere in the warrant or the evidence does one find a contention by
the Service that the activities of these groups have presented imminent danger
to the political stability of the nation 4 Since the statute should be applied
only when the activities of the groups present an immediate threat to organ-
ized government, Bridges' deportation thereunder would seem to violate his
constitutional rights.
If, finally, civil liberties are to be accorded special protection, one may with
reason expect the courts to declare void the tariff barrier against the im-
portation of opinions. Intellectual mercantilism is a sign of fear, and fear
37. Sears, supra note 13, at 85-104, 161-164.
38. Opening Brief for Petitioner, p. 216, In re Harry Bridges.
39. First enunciated in Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919).
40. See Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 261-263 (1941) ; Cant, ell v. Connecti-
cut, 310 U. S. 296, 308 (1940) ; Carlson v. California, 310 U. S. 106, 113 (1940) ; Thorn-
hill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 104-105 (1940) ; Schneider v. State, 303 U. S. 147 (1939);
Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242, 258 (1937).
41. Inspector Sears' Memorandum of Decision cites the Communist Manifesto oi
1848, the 1920 Theses of the Third International, and Lenin's Stale and Rc-,oluttion,
with reference to testimony as to Communist aims, which testimony made no allusion
to a specific time period. Sears, supra note 13, at 31-36.
1942]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
a sign of decadence. The real danger to the nation comes from those who
disguise their aims. Open avowal of purpose leaves no place for plotting.
The Statute and Retroactivity. The amendment to the statute provides
that the deportation law shall apply to an alien continuously from the time
of his entry. Therefore, as applied to Bridges, it is retroactive and subject
to attack under both the ex post facto 42 and due process 43 provisions of the
Constitution. But the exact line of this attack is complicated by the lack
of unanimity on the meaning of the ex post facto prohibition. 44 In fact two
conflicts exist- one as to whether the restriction applies to civil as well as
criminal penalties, the other on whether deportation involves a purely civil
remedy or punishment as well.
Dispute over the first point is by now nearly resolved. Although some cases
have said that a criminal penalty must be involved,45 the weight of authority,
relying on Ex parte Garland4 6 and Cummings v. Missouri,47 has asserted
the more reasonable view that mere punishment, of whatever nature, is the
criterion. " Both the Garland and Cummings cases involved nothing of a
criminal nature but rather the question of a "test-oath." The penalty in-
volved for failure to make the oath was disqualification from teaching or
preaching in the one case and from the practice of law in the other. More-
over, Pierce v. Carskadon4 9 followed the reasoning of these cases, and its
fact situation included no criminal features.50 Cooley's is probably the best
statement of the law:
if it deprives a party of any valuable right -like the
right to follow a lawful calling- for acts which were innocent, or
42. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 9(3).
43. U. S. CONsT. AMEND. V.
44. "The prohibition 'that no state shall pass any ex post facto law' necessarily re-
quires some explanation; for, naked and without explanation, it is unintelligible, and
means nothing." Mr. Justice Chase, in Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 385, 390 (1798). But
compare Dean Pound: "When it is prescribed that 'no bill of attainder or ex post facto
law shall be passed' . . . the precept . . .has a definite content, given analytically or
historically, involving no margin of judgment or opinion in its application." Pound's
Introduction to THE SUPREME COURT AND MINIMUM WAGE LEGISLATION (1925) xiv.
45. See Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U. S. 585, 591 (1913); Johannessen v. United
States, 225 U. S. 227, 242 (1912); CooLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1931) §3.
46. 4 Wall. 333 (U. S. 1866).
47. 4 Wall. 277 (U. S. 1866).
48. See Pierce v. Carskadon, 16 Wall. 234, 239 (U. S. 1872) ; 4 BL. CoM. *377;
BLACK, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1927) §266; COOLEY, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (7th ed. 1903) 375-376; McAllister, Ex Post Facto Laws in the
Supreme Court of the United States (1927) 15 CALIF. L. REV. 269, 281-282; but sec
Comment, Special Legislation Discriminating Against Specified Individuals and Groups
(1942) 51 YALE L. J. 1358, 1359.
49. 16 Wall. 234 (U. S. 1872).
50. The case involved a change in West Virginia law whereby a defendant from out
of the state could not reopen a case dealing with a property attachment unless he took
an oath similar to that required in the Garland and Cummings cases. The Supreme Court
held that these cases were controlling.
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at least not punishable by law when committed, the law will he
ex post facto in the constitutional sense, notwithstanding it does
not in terms declare the acts to which the penalty is attached
criminal."'5 1
The real controversy is over the nature of the deportation process. A
long-standing judicial habit has been the facile utterance of dicta to the effect
that deportation is civil rather than criminal in nature 2 On the other hand,
some have recognized its nature as a punishment.53 Realistically, deporta-
tion is clearly a punishment, involving as it does arrest and removal from
one's family and livelihood.5 4 Moreover, the Supreme Court dicta viewing
the ex post facto prohibition as inapplicable to deportation cases were un-
necessary to the case holdings. In Johanncssen v. Unitcd Slacs5 the situa-
tion involved not deportation, but naturalization, and naturalization obtained
by fraud. In Bugajcwitz v. Adams 0 the alien woman was practising prosti-
tution- the reason for the deportationI -at the time of her arrest. And, in
Mahler v. Eby,,57 the actual holding of the Court was to stay the alien's
deportation, since the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor was defective
by reason of his failure to find "that such aliens are undesirable residents
of the United States." 5
It seems meaningless, however, to argue the question through logic and
distinction. In this field legal dialectics can be replaced by judicial states-
manship. ;9 On the one hand, the anendment to the deportation law is part
51. COOLEY, CONSTITUrIONAL LIMITATIONS (7th ed. 1903) 375-376.
52. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391, 399 (1938); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S.
32, 39 (1924); United States cx rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U. S. 149, 154 (1923);
Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U. S. 585, 591 (1913); Johannessen .'. United States, 225
U. S. 227, 242 (1912) ; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 730 (1S931.
53. See '.Mr. Justice Brandeis in Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 284 (1922):
"It may result also in loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life worth liv-
ing." Wallis v. Tecchio, 65 F. (2d) 250, 252 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933) : "The statute in its effect
upon the individual must be classified as penal ...We regard forfeiture for misconduct
of the privilege of an existing residence in the United States as a penalty." United States
ex rel. Klonis v. Davis, 13 F. (2d) 630 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926): "However heinous his
crimes, deportation is to him exile, a dreadful punishment, abandoned by the common
consent of all civilized peoples. Such, indeed, it would be to anyone . . ."
54. See Comment, Special Lcgislation Discriminating Against Specificd Indihiduals
and Groups (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 1358, 1363-1364.
55. 225 U. S. 227 (1912).
56. 228 U. S. 585 (1913).
57. 264 U. S. 32 (1924).
58. 41 STAT. 593 (1920), 8 U. S. C. § 157 (1940).
59. "The effect of the legislation is to secure the deportation of these aliens. This
is a punishment . ..This is the bare logic of the problem. But on the other hand, the
considerations in favor of the retroactive operation of the legislation are of the most
compelling sort. Here again is a choice of alternatives. We must conclude that the
answer the court will give will depend on the view the court takes as to the importance
of the legislation." McAllister, Ex Post Facto Laws in the Supreme Court of the Unitcd
States (1927) 15 CAaLr. L. REv. 269, 283.
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of an attitude toward aliens which has been one of the viciously unreasonable
factors in American history. With this in mind it is easy to declare the
amendment void on ex post facto grounds. As a matter of fact, in view of
the protections such a declaration would afford aliens, there is good reason
for the flat pronouncement that deportation is a criminal penalty. On the
other hand, retroactivity may be a necessary quality of future deportation
laws. To shut the door entirely may prove to be too strict a limitation on
legislative policy -especially to a judiciary recently intent on self-restraint.
It is probable that the latter argument will prevail. A court intent on avoiding
the setting of too broad a precedent, and concerned with the equities of the
particular case, is likely to seek a less forceful mode of handling the statute.
Such an avenue of escape exists in the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Two doctrinal paths are available under the clause, one based
on the retroactivity itself, the other subsumed under the catch-phrase of
"reasonable relation." Of the first concept it has been said, "The more
limited ex post facto or contract clauses may now be regarded simply as
encyclopaedic subdivisions of the due process clause."0 0 The limits of this
judicial weapon are difficult to define. Where a statute has been condemned,
the discussion has been in terms of "arbitrary" interferences with "vested
rights," or "unreasonable" impositions of duties and obligations on the basis
of past events. 01 Such a course was followed in Untermeyer v. Anderson,"2
where the Supreme Court held a gift tax invalid under the due process
clause because of its retroactivity. Later, in Welch v. Henry3 (where a
retroactive income tax was upheld), the Court explained the gift tax cases:
"Since, in each of these cases, the donor might freely have chosen
to give or not to give, the taxation, after the choice was made . . .
was thought to be . . . a denial of due process."
04
In addition to this solicitude for taxpayers who make transactions under
existing law, the Court has, in Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Com-
pany,65 struck down an administrative tax regulation which seemed designed
more to get at a particular past transaction than to provide a working rule
for the future.
Both considerations should control the amendment under consideration
here. Even if Bridges had joined or had close connections with the Com-
munist Party and/or the Marine Workers Industrial Union, neither organ-
ization was under statutory ban at the time. To catch him up later seems
flatly an unconstitutional condition on his privilege of remaining in this
60. Shulman, Retroactive Legislation in 13 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TiE SOCIAL, SCeMNcv5
(1934) 355.
61. Ibid.
62. 276 U. S. 440 (1928).
63. 305 U. S. 134 (1938).
64. Id. at 147.
65. 306 U. S. 110 (1939).
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country. The "past transaction" doctrine of the R. J. Reynolds case should
also apply here. The elation of Congressman Hobbs, apparently the author
of the bill,60 over its passage, reveals how dearly it was pointed at the
past activities of one individual. Although the case can be distinguished on
the ground that it concerned an administrative regulation rather than the
legislative pronouncement here involved, the distinction seems more than
counterbalanced by the fact that the economic privileges of the taxpayer
do not deserve and do not receive the full protections afforded the civil
liberties of the individual.
Equally applicable is the "reasonable relation" doctrine. Under that con-
cept the actual exercise of legislative authority must bear some reasonable
relation to the purpose for which the Constitution allows such power to be
exercised. The Cummings and Garland cases have bearing here also. In
both, the Supreme Court found that "many of the acts, from the taint of
whidch they must purge themselves, have no possible relation to their fitness
for those pursuits and professions."' 7 Admittedly, the police power was there
involved; whereas the deportation amendment concerns the perhaps broader
authority of sovereignty. The punishment, however, is more stringent here,
and certainly the basic reasoning of the Court applies. No matter how
potent the sovereign power, a deportation statute must be aimed at a single
goal-ridding the nation of undesirables. It is difficult to find such a
purpose in a purely retroactive amendment.
The fact of former affiliation is no necessary indication of present un-
desirability.68 In the Bridges hearings themselves, for example, several of
the government witnesses were former Communists who had finally seen
the light.69 Under the statute they too, if aliens, would then have been
deportable. It must be noted, too, that mere former affiliation is cause for
deportation. Of course, the Congress can argue that just the fact that an
alien ever became connected with organizations beyond the pale is sufficient
to reveal a fundamental attitude, a weakness in character which might well
hold throughout his life. This contention supports the claim that the statute
bears some relation to the purpose for the exercise of the legislative power,
but it can hardly carry enough weight to make the relation a "reasonable"
66. Representative Smith, who introduced the bill said, "Judge Hobbs is better able
to discuss the technicalities of this law than I am, because he really wrote it over in
the judiciary Committee." Hearings before Senate Sub-Comnmittee of the Committee on
the Judiciary on H. R. 5138, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) 11.
67. Cummings v. 'Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 319 (U. S. 1866); Ex tarte Garland, 4
Wall. 333, 380 (U. S. 1866). In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399-00O (1923), the
Court said, "The established doctrine is that this liberty may not be interfered with, under
the guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary ur
without reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State to effeLt."
68. See CHAFEE, Faaa SPEcH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941) 445.
69. Sears, In the Matter of Harry Renton Bridges, Memorandum of Decision (1941)
23-30.
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one. Courts need no data to take judicial notice of the fact that people
change their minds for varied reasons- social, economic, psychological-
and that they are usually better for the experience. Such notice means the
substitution of judicial judgment for that of the legislature; but the Supreme
Court has with good reason adopted such a policy in civil liberties cases. 70
Deportation, after all, involves more than mere reprimand.
ADMINISTRATIvE APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE
As background to the several legal problems arising from the administra-
tive interpretation of the statute, there should be kept in mind the fact that
courts will not issue habeas corpus writs in deportation cases unless there
has been an unfair hearing, 71 or the application of an erroneous rule
of law,72 or conclusions not supported by the evidence.73 This last test is
nebulous ;74 but commentators agree that the Supreme Court is increasingly
giving closer examination to the evidence in deportation cases. 75 And there
is good cause for such policy here. A chief reason for judicial tolerance
of administrative regulations is technical knowledge possessed by the executive
branch; but this factor is generally lacking in deportation cases. In the
Bridges case no "expert" was used, no technician's hand required. And if
decisions in the case have been made by non-specialists, it follows that the
courts- the usual source of ethical judgments -might well examine care-
fully the judicial decisions made by the executive division in this case.
The Repetition of Hearings. Such close scrutiny should be first directed
at the problems engendered by the fact that Bridges had already averted
70. See text discussion supra pp. 111-112; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 95-96
(1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 161 (1939).
71. See Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U. S. 8, 12 (1908); The Japanese Inmil-
grant Case, 189 U. S. 86, 101 (1903).
72. Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U. S. 3 (1915).
73. See United States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U. S. 131, 133 (1924).
74. The test has been stated in various ways. The Court "must find adequate sup-
port in the evidence." Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U. S. 454, 458 (1920). There must
be "sufficient evidence to fairly sustain the finding of the Secretary." Lewis v. Frick,
233 U. S. 291, 297 (1914). There must be evidence "adequate to support the Secretary's
conclusions of fact." Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U. S. 272, 274-275 (1912). There must be
evidence from which the finding "might reasonably have been inferred." United States
ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U. S. 131, 133 (1924).
75. See VAX VLEcK, THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF ALIENS (1932) 194: "This
scrutiny of evidence is common in both exclusion and expulsion cases. In the circuit
courts of appeal the action of the administrative officers has been held bad in several cases
as a result. In the Supreme Court there has as yet been no case of reversal solely on
that ground, but in several the evidence has been examined with the avowed purpose of
thus testing it, although after due consideration the court has declared it sufficient." Also,
Secretary of Labor's Committee on Administrative Procedure, The ninsigratlion and
Naturalization Service (1940) 11: "The reversal of the Supreme Court's attitude toward
consideration of the evidence in immigration cases is the single most striking aspect of
its general change of approach toward such cases which we have earlier described."
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executive deportation prior to the hearings based on the amended statute.
These problems fit into the legal compartments of double jeopardy, res judi-
cata, and due process of law.7" Double jeopardy offers little possibility as a
ground for setting aside the second hearings and findings. The strict confines
of the doctrine seem to include acts of a criminal nature only.-7 Even the cases
cited by petitioner in support of the application of the doctrine involve a
previous criminal conviction. 8 Yet here the issues in the first hearing did
parallel those of the second. The sole cause for the second hearing was the
need to determine the applicability of the retrospective amendment. After
the Kessler v. Strecker"9 decision, however, the warrant in the first hearing
was amended so that "all four charges in the amended warrant were framed
to state that Bridges both was and is a member of or affiliated with the
organization described."80 In the light of a determination that deportation
is heavy punishment, this repetition seems unfair. Though the double jeopardy
concept is technically inapplicable, the issue of fairness is never inappropriate
in a judicial proceeding. There seems good justification, then, for the
District Court to put to use here the potent weapon of "due process of law."
Much the same policy should be followed with the issue of res judicata.
Whether or not it can apply here in its technical sense is controversial. First,
there is dispute over the power of administrative bodies to reopen a case
already litigated before them.s1 And, second, the specific application of the
doctrine to administrative deportation cases such as this is open to question.
Pearson v. W~illiains 2 held that the Secretary of Commerce and Labor
could order a second hearing even though the alien had already been ad-
76. It can be argued that the arbitrary singling-out of Bridges for prosecution
under the statute is a denial of equal protection of the laws. Even though a statute b2
valid, an arbitrary application of it may constitute a violation of the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Yick Wo v. Hoplins, 118 U. S. 356, 373-
374 (1886). The Federal Government is not expressly denied the power to treat its pea-
pIe unequally, but it is possible that "the 'due process of law' provision of the Fifth Amend-
ment is broad enough in its scope and purpose to include the 'equal protection of the
laws,' which no state may deny to any person under the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment." United States v. Yount, 267 Fed. E61, 863 (W. D. Pa. 1920).
77. See 1 Co LEY., CONsTrUTIO .L LtmITATIONs (8th ed. 1927) 05-92; 2 ViL-
LOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1910) § 424.
78. United States v. La Franca, 282 U. S. 568 (1931); United States v. Gates, 25
Fed. Cas. 1263, No. 15,191 (S. D. N. Y. 1845). Opening Brief for Petitioner, p. 157,
In re Harry Bridges.
79. 307 U. S. 22 (1939).
80. Landis, supra note 1, at 1. (emphasis supplied).
81. For support of administrative authority to reopen, see FCC v. Pottsville Broad-
casting Co., 309 U. S. 134 (1940); Fair v. Hartford Rubber Workb, 95 Cunn. 359,
111 Atl. 193 (1920); Industrial Commission v. Dell, 104 Ohiu St. 319, 135 N. E. 69
(1922). For holdings denying such power, see Conley v. Ups-n Co., 197 App. Div. 815,
189 N. Y. Supp. 473 (3d Dep't 1921); Ford Motor Cv. v. State, 178 Utla. 193, 02 P.
(2d) 48 (1936). And for a thorough treatment of the whole field, see Comment, Res
Judicata in Administrativc Law (1940) 49 Y.LE L. J. 1250.
82. 202 U. S. 281 (1906).
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mitted after hearing; but Leung Jun v. United States83 held that a prior
determination "after a full hearing" of an individual's right to reside here
was a conclusive adjudication of his privilege to remain in the country.
It is possible to distinguish the cases on the ground that the first hearing
in the Pearson case was summary and superficial, while that in the Leung Jun
case was full and complete.8 4 If the distinction is valid, the doctrine could
be held controlling in the Bridges case, for the first hearing, before Dean
Landis, was certainly "full." There is danger, nevertheless, in such a pro-
nouncement. However strong the reasons for the application of res judicata
to this particular case, the effect, as precedent, of such an application might
well serve to hamstring the operations of administrative agencies dealing with
problems of a continuous nature. It would seem better, therefore, to con-
demn the second hearing as violative of due process of law. So general a
condemnation cannot serve as so strong a precedent as the direct use of
res judicata.
Such a decision is of course predicated on the assumption that the issues
at the second hearing duplicated those at the first. Superficidlly they may
seem different since the second hearing was based on a different statute
and the government presented different witnesses. But, as has been stated
above in the discussion of double jeopardy, the warrant in the first hearing
included the charges litigated at the second. And, further, the government's
line of proof was the same. In the first hearing the following was asked
of Bridges:
"Q. Are you now a member of the Communist Party?
A. No.
Q. Or have you at any other time in the past been a inember of the Coin-
munist Party?85
A. No." 86
Moreover, the government's brief to Dean Landis admitted that the evidence
was directed toward past membership.87 Such duplication in both the plead-
ing and the proof seems clearly a denial of due process of law.
The Attorney General. The opinion of the Attorney General, also, is open
to question. Argument is made first that his jurisdiction is lacking. Nowhere
in the opinion does it appear how he took the case. Since cases come up
83. 171 Fed. 413 (C. C. A. 2d, 1909).
84. See Comment, Res udicata in Administrative Law (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1250,
1255.
85. Emphasis supplied.
86. Record, vol. 1, p. 11, In the Matter of Harry Renton Bridges (1939).
87. "It is the Government position that it has shown 'that prior to the arrest of
Harry Bridges he was a member of the Communist Party and has continued as such. It
contends, and submits it has been proved, that, the alien having been shown to be a
member of the Communist Party, the obligation rested upon him to show that lie had
ceased to be such member . . ." Brief for the Government, pp. 100-101, In re Harry
R. Bridges (1939).
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to him only under certain specialized conditions,8 8 petitioner cites Mahlcr
v. Ebys9 as controlling; for there the failure of the Secretary of Labor to
assert his jurisdiction was held to make the warrant of deportation fatally
defective. Then petitioner claims that the Attorney General, as a reviewing
tribunal set up over the Board of Immigration Appeals, had no power to
examine the facts de novo. This view is based on the language creating the
administrative structure; the Attorney General is to take a case "for review
of the Board's decision." 0 Moreover, the Special Assistant to the Attorney
General in charge of the Immigration and Naturalization Service has stated,
"The title of the Board of Review was changed to that of the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals, and it was made a larger body with quasi-judicial juris-
diction and to a degree independent of this service."0 1
Next the procedure adopted by the Attorney General is attacked. It is
argued that if the Attorney General saw fit to do more than review the issues
of law in the case, he should have granted Bridges the opportunity to be
heard before him. And the Morgan cases92 are cited in support of that
contention. In addition, he could not have considered the oral argument made
before the Board of Immigration Appeals, since no transcript of the testimony
was taken. And he, without notice, gave weight to the testimony of wit-
nesses whose evidence both Inspector Sears and the Board had seen fit to
disregard. 3 Finally, it is claimed that, in view of the fact that he reversed
the Board without hearing, the Attorney General should have issued a pro-
posed finding to which petitioner could have argued.
Now each of these claims, taken separately, can be defeated. The mere
failure of the Attorney General to notify the parties he was taking the case
and the consequent asserted lack of jurisdiction should hardly be cause for
overthrowing the whole process. In this regard the Mahler case is an
anomaly; it would seem that the Court there hit upon the issue as the easiest
method of disposing of an unfair, retroactive deportation. The better view
88. "Board of Immigration Appeals; reference of cases to the Attorney General.
In any case in which a dissent has been recorded; in any case in which the Board shall
certify that a question of difficulty is involved; in any case in which the B oard orders
the suspension of deportation pursuant to the provisions of section 19(C) of the Immi-
gration Act of 1917, as amended, or in any case in which the Attorney General so di-
rects, the Board of Immigration Appeals shall refer the case to the Attorney General
for review of the Board's decision." CODE F.n. REG., tit. 8, § 90.12 (Supp. 1940).
89. 264 U. S. 32 (1924).
90. See note 83 supra.
91. Annual Report of the Attorney General of the United States, Fiscal Year Ended
June 30, 1941 (1941) 225.
92. Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1 (1938), rehearing denicd, 304 U. S. 23
(1938) ; 'Morgan v. United States, 29S U. S. 468 (1936).
93. "Although judge Sears concluded that their evidence, for one reason or another,
did not establish membership in or affiliation with the Communist Party, taken as a
whole it cannot, because of its volume, be completely disregarded." Biddle, In re Harry
Bridges, Before the Attorney General in Deportation Proceedings (1942) 26.
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is that such defects are to be corrected without prejudice to the agency.! 4
To hold otherwise is merely to indulge in prejudice against a flexible admin-
istrative process. And the provisions of the deportation process pertaining
to the Board of Immigration Appeals and the Attorney General's review
of its decisions are for the purpose of saving the time of the latter official,
who obviously would find it impossible to give all immigration and alien
cases his close scrutiny. If, however, he does decide to go thoroughly into
a particular case, there seems little to prevent him. He is, after all, the
administrative head of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
The allegations of procedural defects are also individually unpersuasive.
In the first place, the chief administrative officer hardly has the time to go
over every bit of evidence and grant hearings thereon.9 This view was by
inference upheld by the Supreme Court at the very time of the Morgan
cases. 6 And the commentators are in accord. 97 Secondly, this purely prag-
matic reason of lack of time seems to be good cause also for not giving
notice of proposed findings and allowing argument thereon.
But separate consideration of defects fails to give perspective. It must be
noted that the Attorney General, though the administrative structure con-
templated otherwise, did choose to give the case a fact review. Although
the conclusion be that no one of the charges mentioned was so gross an
error as to constitute an unfair hearing, the fact that such errors were made
after a voluntary choice of the Attorney General should have bearing. None
can say that the treatment given Bridges was the best an administrative
agency could offer. Taken as a whole, such treatment was unfair. To take
a case without notice or hearing, to reverse the decision of the Board below
without affording argument on proposed findings, and then to refuse a peti-
tion for rehearing- this is harsh action. And when consideration is given
also to the fact that the whole idea of a second hearing for Bridges seems
discriminatory, ample justification can be found for the invocation of "denial
of due process of law."
Credibility of Witnesses. The portion of the administrative process devoted
to the credibility of witnesses deserves particularly close judicial study, since
94. See Stallings v. Splain, 253 U. S. 339, 343 (1920); Nishimura Ekiu v. United
States, 142 U. S. 651, 652 (1892).
95. "The Supreme Court has not said that it was the duty of the Secretary of
Agriculture to hear or read all the evidence and, in addition thereto, to hear the oral
arguments and to read and consider briefs. If the Supreme Court had said that it
would have meant that the Packers and Stockyards Act . . . cannot be administercd."
Morgan v. United States, 23 F. Supp. 380, 382 (W. D. Mo. 1937), rez'd on other grounds,
304 U. S. 1 (1938).
96. See Eastland Co. v. FCC, 92 F. (2d) 467 (App. D. C. 1937), cert. denied, 302
U. S. 735 (1937).
97. Feller, Prospectus for the Further Study of Federal Administrative Law (1938)
47 YALE L. J. 647, 662-663; GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw-CASES AND COMMENTS
(1940) 746-751.
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that issue is a matter of law in deportation proceedings.08 Moreover, Inspec-
tor Sears and the Attorney General are in disagreement with the Board of
Immigration Appeals on the subject. And such judicial inquiry is per-
missible and plausible since the testimony in the case does not consist of
technical information to be understood only by the expert, but rather of the
narration of conversations and events.
Various facts are significant here. Of the fifteen witnesses relied on by the
Immigration Service to prove membership in the Communist Party, the testi-
mony of only two, O'Neil and Lundeberg, was accepted by Inspector Sears
as direct support of his finding, and the testimony of one, Barlow, was given
"some weight." 99 Lundeberg, as a union leader, was a rival of Bridges and
so, as Inspector Sears admitted, was "strongly biased"100 against Bridges
and felt "the trade union movement would be better off without him."1 0 1
Lundeberg, moreover, during the second hearing gave three different versions
of his conversation with Bridges, 02 and "in three different interviews [with
Government agents] during the six years since the dinner in 1935 . . .
he [Lundeberg] had no information that Bridges was a Communist."10 3
O'Neil, the other witness relied on, denied on the stand making any of the
written statements attributed to him which spoke of Bridges as a Com-
munist3es Further, the written statements are themselves internally incon-
sistent.'05 Then testimony by Service officials was allowed for impeachment
purposes, even though O'Neil's testimony was no surprise nor of affirmative
damage to the Service, and Inspector Sears held such testimony to be affirma-
tive evidence for the Service, in disregard of regulations of the Service.100
The Attorney General held that petitioner had waived the right to object
to the testimony in O'Neil's written statements by failure to object at the
hearing before Inspector Sears, whereas objection was actually made to
Inspector Sears, 07 and whereas objection was also made to the Board of
98. Nagle v. Eizaguirre, 41 F. (2d) 735 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930).
99. See In re: Harry Renton Bridges, Before the Board of Immigration Appeals in
Deportation Proceedings (1942) 5, n. 3.
100. Sears, In the Matter of Harry Renton Bridges, Memorandum of Decision (1941)
104, 106-107.
101. Record, vol. 5, p. 7122, In the Matter of Harry Renton Bridges (1939).
102. Board, supra note 99, at 85.
103. Id. at 86. Record, vol. 5, pp. 7089-7090, 7120-7121, In the Matter of Harry Ren-
ton Bridges (1939).
104. Board, supra note 99, at 56.
105. Id. at 56-58.
106. New Regulations Governing the Arrest and Deportation of Aliens, § 19.1(c),
6 FFD. REG. 68 (1941). This section of the regulations requires that statements of wit-
nesses must, to be used in evidence, be signed and sworn to under oath. None of O'Neil's
recorded statements was signed or sworn to. Violation of an internal rule of the Service
is denial of due process. United States ex rel. Ohm v. Perkins, 79 F. (2d) 533 (C. C. A.
2d, 1935).
107. "It was strenuously urged by Counsel for the alien at the hearing, and similar
argument is made in the alien's brief, that the admission of the statement taken by
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Immigration Appeals, which is considered part of the administrative process.
Finally, the evidence of affiliation was based largely on Bridges' own testi-
mony, over which there is fundamental disagreement between Inspector Sears
and the Board.
08
This roll call ought to prove that the question of witness credibility should
not be dismissed by the Attorney General on the mere ground that Inspector
Sears was present to observe the witnesses' demeanor. The main issues in
the Bridges case are not so much the manner of witnesses as their political
and personal backgrounds and what they said. Patent inconsistency in testi-
mony can be found in print and examined; this the Board did in a thorough-
going manner. Admittedly, discussion of the actual evidence is not within
the province of this Comment; but it seems more than unjust to subject
an alien to deportation because of the testimony of two men - one an avowed
rival in his trade, the other a denier of his own evidence.
Wiretapping. A fairly minor point in petitioner's case is that of wire-
tapping. Some six weeks after the hearings before Inspector Sears were
closed, Bridges discovered that his telephone wires in New York City were
being tapped by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. His attorneys
thereupon moved to have the hearings reopened in order to discover whether
any testimony there given was based on intercepted messages. Although
Inspector Sears admitted the later wiretapping,1 9 he denied the motion on
the ground that there was no evidence to show it had been used to secure
evidence for the hearing itself. The problem is purely one of judgment.
On the one hand,,it is not unreasonable to assume that the Federal Bureau
of Investigation tapped Bridges' wires before the hearing, since there was
all the more reason for doing so at that time, with a deportation hearing
scheduled. On the other hand, there was no hint at the hearing itself of
evidence so procured, nor of any outside evidence beyond a presumption.
Decision on such a problem seems best made by the trial examiner, for if
wiretapping had been employed, the evidence it uncovered would have been
put in the hearing by perjured witnesses who had memorized the informa-
tion. It is altogether reasonable to expect Inspector Sears, better than any-
one else, to have seen whether or not witnesses for the government were
uttering details about incidents which they had put to memory but never
experienced.11o
Mrs. Segerstrom was error and that the statement itself, under the circumstances, was
without probative value, and that the testimony of Major Schofield was erroneously
received and was without probative value." Sears, supra note 100, at 114.
108. Board, supra note 99, at 45.
109. See Sears, supra note 100, at 183-184.
110. Even if wiretapping for the hearing had been proved, a nice question would arise.
On the one hand, the Supreme Court has declared the method an "unreasonable search"
with the result that information indirectly derived thereby is banned as evidence. Nat'-
done v. United States, 308 U. S. 338 (1939). On the other hand, the formal rules of
evidence do not apply to deportation proceedings. "Hearsay evidence is admissible; pho-
[Vol. 52: 108
IN RE HARRY BRIDGES
Affiliation and Standard of Conduct. On the subject of "affilation" Mr.
Biddle said:
"Judge Sears summarizes Bridges' attitude toward the Com-
munist Party and its policies by saying that the 'isolated instances,'
while not evidence to establish membership in or affiliation with the
Communist Party, nevertheless show a sympathetic or cooperative
attitude on his part to the Party, and form 'a pattern which is
more consistent with the conclusion that the alien followed this
course of conduct as an affiliate of the Communist Party, rather
than as a matter of chance coincidence.' This conclusion, said Judge
Sears, was strengthened by his consistently favoring non-discrim-
ination against union men because of Communist membership; and
by his excoriating 'red baiters' as he called those who took an
opposite view, which 'amounted to cooperation with the Communist
Party in carrying out its program of penetration and boring from
within.' "1n
The term has elsewhere been given much stricter meaning."- And as
defined here, "affiliation" becomes much too broad a word. The cooperation
and sympathy as seen by Inspector Sears are only on aims which are legiti-
mate union activities. Is an alien to be deported because he accepts aid for his
union in a time of crisis? Is an alien to be deported because the pursuance
of his labor policies causes him to duplicate the aims of a Communist Party
line? Under the Sears-Biddle definition, an alien who is in sympathy with
some of the aims of an organization but refuses to join it because it advo-
cates overthrow of the government is nevertheless to be deported for his
tographs may be compared; the authorities may have recourse to information in their
files in other cases . . ." Oppenheimer, Recent Der,,lopments in /fe Deportation Pro-
cess (1938) 36 MicH. L. Rv. 355, 361. It seems likely that the Court would grant
aliens the protection, since its bitter view of wiretapping is based on broad policy and the
deportation process has so serious a result.
111. Biddle, supra note 93, at 27-23.
112. "He must be more than merely in sympathy with its aims or even willing to
aid it in a casual intermittent way. Affiliation includes an element of dependability upon
which the organization can rely which, though not equivalent to membership duty, do.s
rest upon a course of conduct that could not be abruptly ended without giving at least
reasonable cause for the charge of a breach of good faith." United States ex rel. Kettun-
en v. Reimer, 79 F. (2d) 315, 317 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
"'Affiliation' is plainly a word that speaks in terms of a strunger bond than 'associa-
tion.' In the corporate field its use embraces not the casual affinity of an occasi, nal sini-
larity of objective, but ties and connections that, though less than that co)mplete contrl
which parent possesses over subsidiary, are nevertheless sufficient to create a cuntinuing
relationship that embraces both units within the concept of a system. In the field cd
eleemosynary and political organization the same basic idea prevmils. Thus thinking in
terms of affiliation as distinguished from membership must have regard to a Lond of tiis
general nature existing, explicitly or implicitly, between the alien and the proieribed or-
ganization." Landis, In the Matter of Harry R. Bridges, Findings and Conclusions of
Trial Examiner (1939) 11.
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"affiliation," although the organization is proscribed for the same reason for
which he refused to join. When these possibilities are viewed in conjunction
with the retroactive features of the statute - so that an alien can become
"affiliated" with an organization later to be outlawed -it becomes apparent
that the application of the statute here provides too vague a "standard of
conduct."
113
The Comnmunist Party. Though Bridges' attorneys have never argued the
issue, 14 the question whether the Communist Party or the Marine Workers
Industrial Union, an alleged affiliate, advocate overthrow of the government
by force or violence is obviously important in the Bridges case. A finding
that the Party does not would release him even though the statute and other
interpretations of it be held valid. The question is not easy to answer.
Courts have struggled with the question for years; most have held that the
Communist Party does advocate governmental overthrow,115 but a persuasive
recent decision held that more evidence than mere membership in the Party
was necessary for deportation. 116 On the question of the actual program
of a political party the Supreme Court has said that the test of a party's
beliefs should be its statements in convention.117 Despite the fact that the
constitution of the Party provides for the expulsion of those of its members
advocating violence,"" Inspector Sears and the Attorney General relied on
the Communist Manifesto and the statements of former members of the
113. United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81 (1921) ; and see A. B. Small
Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 267 U. S. 233, 239 (1925) for statement that the
concept applies t-, civil as well as criminal cases. Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32 (1924),
should not be cited contra. The Supreme Court there held a deportation statute valid
against the same charge; while we are here concerned with an unconstitutional applica-
tion of a statute.
114. Observe here a point of tactics. If petitioner had raised the issue, it would have
meant that an alien accused of Communism would be putting leaders of the Communist
Party on as his own witnesses. The impression would be unfavorable and their testi-
mony unpredictable. For a time it appeared that the negative policy would pay dividends,
for the Party itself asked to intervene in the Federal District Court on the grounds that
its rights were being adjudicated. It was, however, denied permission. Had it been
successful, the Party would have been fighting for itself; Bridges, though thereby aided,
would have avoided the stigma. The court's denial, however, means that petitioner has
now no means of raising the question.
115. Sormunen v. Nagle, 59 F. (2d) 398 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932) ; Berkman v. Tilliig-
hast, 58 F. (2d) 621 (C. C. A. 1st, 1932) ; United States cx ret. Yokinen v. Commis-
sioner, 57 F. (2d) 707 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932) ; Ex parte Vilarino, 50 F. (2d) 582 (C. C. A.
9th, 1931).
116. Strecker v. Kessler, 95 F. (2d) 976 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938), aff'd on othcr grounds,
307 U. S. 22 (1939).
117. See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73, 84-85 (1932).
118. N. Y. Times, May 29, 1938, § 4, p. 7, col. 3. See also BROWDR, WHAT Is COM-
muNism? (1936) 166: "Communists, despite what their enemies say, do not advocate
or idealize violence." For a discussion of the issues involved, see Note (1938) 48 YAuX
L. J. 111.
IN RE HARRY BRIDGES
Party.11  The real difficulty is that the Party has no static beliefs. 9 Further
trouble is caused by the retroactive amendment in operation here, whereby
the Party's beliefs at all times since the alien joined or became affiliated
must be examined.
There is no clear-cut solution; but within the framework of a statute
which makes a personal liability of organizational opinion,' 1 inferences and
imputations should be out of place. "Instead, the determinative criteria should
be the actual policy of the organization at the alleged date of membership
as evidenced by official documents of the party. Any less stringent require-
ment is likely to permit perversion of the deportation process into an addi-
tional weapon against American labor leaders who did not happen to be
born in the United States." 1m Since the evidence of both membership and
affiliation is in dispute here, such a standard seems especially necessary.
Even though the substantive question has been waived by petitioner's failure
to argue the point, the District Court can nevertheless take notice of the
failure to follow the Supreme Court's mandate with regard to the method
by which the substantive question is to be determined. For this is a basic
issue, involving personal rights of freedom of speech and assembly; and
on this point alone habeas corpus should issue.
CONCLUSION
To discuss the Bridges case is to write a brief in his behalf. Seldom has
an individual in American life been subjected to so relentless a hunt; and
so far the law has been one of the most effective weapons at the disposal
of Bridges' enemies. Now that the case has reached the courts, the law
provides plenty of doctrines by which justice can be vindicated and Bridges
freed.
119. Sears, supra note 100, at 18-n2; Biddle, supra note 93, at 7-11.
120. See Strecker v. Kessler, 95 F. (2d) 976, 978 (C C. A. 5th, 1938), aff'd on other
grounds, 307 U. S. 22 (1939) ; Note (1942) 51 YLm L. J. 1215, 1219.
121. "There is no sure test of what a party does advocate. The utterances of a leader
may represent only his personal view and be rejected by his associates. Even platforms
have never been taken very seriously in any party. The law has got itself into a bad
mess by starting investigations into the opinions of associations, the vaguest kind of
inquiry imaginable. The expulsion of hundreds of workingmen from their homes in the
United States. . . ought not to turn on this sort of guesswork" CHATEn, Frxr Srzcn
IN THE UNITEM STATES (1941) 223.
122. Note (193S) 48 YALE L. J. 111, 117.
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